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This paper deals with a multi-period duopoly model under uncertainty. 
When one (or both) of the duopolists has taken an action, there is some kind 
of cooling-period of length T, i.e. a period in which neither of the duo-
polists may take any action. Next there is specified a sequence of equidis-
tant time-points at which the duopolists may or may not take an action. As 
soon as one (or both) of the duopolists takes an action, there again will be 
a cooling period of length T, etc. 
An action for a duopolist is a combination of setting a price for his products 
and choosing a production rate. 
The state of the system is characterized by the following quantities of 
both duopolists: price, production rate, stock and selling rate. 
An action of one (or both) of the duopolists in a state causes a random 
jump to a new state, where the randomness concerns the selling rate of the 
duopolists. 
In the model production costs, stock costs and switching costs are in-
cluded. The infinite horizon problem will be considered and future incomes 
will be discounted. 
It will be shown that this duopoly model can be reformulated as a 
stochastic two-person game model with non-zero sum payoffs and a discount 
factor depending on the state and the actions of the players. It follows from 
the literature on stochastic games that this game possesses an equilibrium 
point. 
Furthermore the one-period model is studied. Under suitable conditions 
(which seem to be quite natural) on the payoff matrices it will be shown that 
the resulting bimatrix game possesses a unique equilibrium point, which con-
sists of nearly pure strategies. Extensions of this result to the multi-
period case will be discussed. 
Key Word,s & Phrases: du.opoly model, two person nonzero sum stoehastie game, 
equilibrium, bimatrix game, uniqueness of equilibrium 
points. 
This report will be submitted for publication elsewhere. 
1. INTRODUCTION AND MODEL FORMULATION 
Quite a lot of papers are published concerning duopoly models. The 
historical viewed first ones studied the non-cooperative static situation 
in which both duopolists once can take an action. The problem was to find 
an equilibrium situation. See for instance COURNOT [1], MAYBERRY [9], 
HENDERSON [6], SHUBIK [19], SCHNEIDER [16] and RUFFIN [13] • 
. Later on within this field of non-cooperative attack dynamic was 
introduced into two directions. The first direction studied the following 
question: How can an equilibrium situation of a static model be reached? 
i.e. starting in an arbitrary situation is there an appealing path to the 
equilibrium situation, where this path consists of a sequence of points at 
which the duopolists simultaneously take an action. This question is closely 
related to stability questions. Literature on this subject can be found in 
THEOCHARIS [22] and [23], SATO-NAGATANI [14], CYERT & DE GROOT [2], 
VAN DER WHEEL [24]. 
The second direction concerns multi-period models both deterministic 
and stochastic. Their problems are the existence of equilibrium points 
(usually in the sense of NASH [10]) for e:g. the discounted model or the 
average payoff model and finding algorithms to obtain the equilibrium points. 
Some results on these subjects can be found in FRIEDMAN [4] and [5], KIRMAN 
& SOBEL [7] and SOBEL [20]. This last direction is for a great deal inspired 
by the results of the theory on stochastic games (for a survey of this field, 
see PARTHASARATHY [ 11]). 
So far we have only mentioned non-cooperative entries. In the develop-
ment of the duopoly theory there also is a stream of papers which attack the 
problem from a cooperative point of view. Contributors to this direction are 
STACKELBERG [21], VON NEUMAN-MORGENSTERN [25], SELTEN [17], SCARF [15] and 
MARS CHAK & SELTEN [ 8] . 
This paper deals with a multi-period duopoly model under uncertainty 
within the non-cooperative setting. In all the above mentioned papers the 
duopolists are assumed to take their actions simultaneously. An essential 
feature of our paper is that this need not be the case. 
We are now going to formulate our model. 
Two duopolists each have the possibility of producing (or buying) and selling 
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a conm1odity. For convenience we confine ourselves to the case with one 
conm1odity. The reader can easily verify that the multi-conm1odity case can 
be attacked along the same lines. 
The state of our system is specified by the following eight quantities: 
(p 1 ,r 1,s 1, v 1 ,p2, r 2,s 2, v2), where pi is player i's price, ri is player i's produc-
tion rate, s. is player i's stocks and v. is player i's selling rate, 
1 1 
i=l,2,. 
An action for a duopolist is a combination of fixing a price at which he 
will offer his conm1odity and choosing a production rate. 
The moments upon which the duopolists may take their actions are specified 
as follows: When one (or both) of the duopolists has taken an action (i.e. 
changing his price or production rate) there is a kind of cooling-period of 
length T, i.e. a period in which neither of the duopolists may take any 
action. Next there is specified a sequence of equidistant time-points, at 
which the duopolists may or may not take an action. However as soon as one 
(or both) of the duopolists takes an action there again will be a cooling-
period of length T, etc. As unit of time we take the distance between two 
consecutive time points, at which the duo~olists may take an action. As an 
example we may think of a situation where both duopolists may or may not 
once a day take an action; in that case T = 1. 
As long as neither of the duopolists takes an action the selling rates 
v 1 and v 2 are assumed to remain constant. 
An action of one (or both) of the duopolists in a state 
x = (p 1,r 1,s 1,v1,p2,r2 ,s2 ,v2) causes a random jump to a new state. This 
randomness concerns the selling rates and may also depend on the present 
state x. 
Let V be the set of pairs (v 1,v2) which can occur. In our model we 
assume V to be finite. 
Let Ai(x) be the set of actions available to duopolists i in state x, 
i = 1,2. Then for each triplet (x,a 1,a2) with x a state, a 1 E A1(x) and 
a2 E A2 (x) there is specified a set of probabilities 
{p((v1,v2) I x,a 1,a~I (v1,v2) EV}, such that 
(1 • 1) 
3 
where p(v1,v2) I x,a1,a2) is the probability that the selling rates v 1 and 
v2 will occur if in state x the duopolists take actions a 1 and a 2 respectiv-
ely. Note that p((v 1,v2) I x,a1,a2) only depends on both a 1 and a2 , when the 
duopolists take actions at the same time. 
In the following we assume that p. and r., i = 1,2, each can only accept 
l. l. 
a finite number of different values and that Tis a positive integer. Further-
more negative stocks are forbidden and duopolist i has a maximum stock 
.. f m • I 2 capacity o s., 1. = , • 
l. 
From the assumptions above and the assumption that Vis finite we can 
deduce that also the stocks can only take on a finite number of different 
values at those moments upon which the duopolists may take actions. This may 
be seen as follows. 
There a:re only a finite number of different stock changing rates (p.-v.) for 
l. l. 
duopolists i, which we assume to be written in decimalform. Let g. be the 
l. 
greatest common divisor of all those numbers (p.-v.) i.e., the greatest 
l. l. 
rational number, which by division on (p.-v.) has an integral outcome for 
l. l. 0 
all (p.-v.). Now it is easy to see that with a starting stocks. the stock 
l. l. l. 
at those moments upon which the duopolists may take an action, can be express-
ed ass?+ n•g. where n is an integer. When we take into account the bounds 
l. l. 
0 ands~ it follows that only a 
l. 
finite number of different stocks can occur. 
Note that the actual upperbound on the stocks 
0 m < m O ( m ) such that s. + n • g. - s. < s. + n + 1 • g .• 
l. l. l. l. l. 
0 m m equals s. + n •g. where n is 
l. l. 
From the above now we see that the state variable x= (pl'rl'sl'vl, 
p2,r2 ,s 2,v2) can only take on a finite number of different values at those 
moments upon which the duopolists may take actions. Let N be this number 
and number those states 1,2, ••• ,N. 
Although the stocks change continuously during a period between two 
consecutive actions, so the state changes continuously, this period is 
characterized by the state k E {1,2, ••. ,N} at the beginning of such a period. 
We therefore in the following use the somewhat abused identification, that 
during such a period the state is k. 
When at a certain time t 0 the state has become k= (p 1,r 1,sl'vl,p2,r2 , 
s 2,v2), belonging to {1,2, ••• ,N}, two things are possible. First if 
p.-v. = 0, i = 1,2 the stocks remain constant, Secondly if p.-v. # 0, 
l. l. l. l. 
i = I and/or 1 = 2, there will be at least one stock that changes in time. 
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As we have assumed stock bounds O and sr, this gives us a bound on the 
sequence of equidistant points, at which the duopolists may or may not 
take an action. Let for state k K(k) be the integral such that 
t 0 + T + K(k) + 1 would be the first time point at which at least one of the 
duopolists has negative stock or exceeds his maximal stock capacity. So 
the time points at which the duopolists can take an action in state k can 
be numbered as 0,1, ••• ,K(k). For the time being we assume that p.-v. I 0 
1 1 
for every state k E {1,2, .•• ,N}. Later on we shall make clear that this is 
not an essential assumption. 
We are now going to specify the cost aspects of our model. 
Let c.(r.) be the production costs per unit of time, when the production 
1 1 
rate is r 1., i = 1,2. Let b.(s.) be the stock costs per unit of time, when 1 1 
the stock level is s 1., i = 1,2. We assume that b.(s.) is a continuous func-1 1 . 
tion in si. 
Then, when at time t 0 the state has become k = (p 1,r1,s 1,v1,p2,r2,s2 ,v2) 
E {1,2, ••• ,N} and if at t > t 0 none of the duopolists has taken an action 
yet, then the profit rate for player i at that time is: 
(I. 2) w. (k,t) = p.v. - c. (r.) - b. (s. + (t-t0 ) (p.-v.)). 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Furthermore there are switching costs. If in state k player i takes 
action a. E A.(k), then he has an innnediate cost h.(k,a.). We are going to 
1 1 1 1 
consider the discounted model over an infinite time horizon. An income at 
-pt 
time twill be discounted by a factor e , with p > O. 
2. REFORMULATION OF THE MODEL AS A TWO-PERSON NONZERO-SUM STOCHASTIC GAME 
What actually happens in the above duopoly model is that in a state 
k E {1,2, ..• ,N} duopolist i chooses 
an action a. E A.(k) which he wants 
1 1 
a time-point t. E {0,1, •.• ,K(k)} and 
1 
to carry out at t .• 
1 
If t 1 < t 2 , then only action a 1(k) is executed. 
If t 1 > t 2, then only action a 2 (k) is executed. 
If t 1 = t 2 , then both a 1(k) and a2 (k) are executed. 
In the game model the two duopolists are of course the two players. 
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The set of states is S = {1,2, ••• ,N}, where k ES should be associated 
with the state k of the duopoly model. 
The action space in state k for player i is {0,1, .•. ,K(k)} x Ai(h), 
i = 1,2. An element of this action space will be denoted by (t.(k),a.(k)). 
l. l. 
If in the duopoly model at time t 0 the state has become k and if the 
duopolists choose action time points t 1(k) and t 2 (k) and actions a 1(k) and 
a2 (k) then the discounted profit for duopolist i from t 0 until the next 
action time point equals: 
(2. 1) 
where 




h. (k,a. (k)) = h. (k,a. (k)) 
l. l. l. l. 
if 
If we substitute (1.2) into (2.1) and set T = T+min(t 1(k),t2(k)) this 
yields: 
(2.2) 
--ptof1-e-pTl --pto[JT t' l 
= e L---J(p.v.-c.(r.)) - e e-p •b.(s.+t'(p.-v.))dt'J 
p l. l. l. l. l. l. l. l. 
0 
Now if in the game model in state k the players choose actions 
(t 1(k),a1(k)) and (t2(k),a2 (k)) then from (2.2) it may be easy under-
standable that as an immediate payoff to player i we define 
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[ -pT] I-e = --- (p.v.-c.(r.)) 
p l.l. l. l. 
-r 
0 
-pt 1 - -pT 
e •b.(s.+t'(p.-v.))dt' - h.(k,a. (k))•e , 
l. l. l. l. l. l. 
where 
The discount factor that belongs to the actions (t 1(k),a 1(k)) and 
(t2 (k),~2 (k)) in state k equals B(k,(t 1(k),a 1(k)),(t2 (k),a2 (k))) = 
e-p(T+m1.n(t1(k),t2(k)), i.e. an immediate payoff in the next state must be 
multiplied by B(k,(t 1(k),a 1(k)),(t2 (k),a2 (k))) for calculating its value at 
the time point at which the system has entered the present state. 
The transition probabilities belonging to the actions (t 1(k),a 1(k)) and 
(t2 (k),a2 (k)) in state k for the game model, equal the transition probabil-
ities as specified under (1.1) in the duopoly model. 
With this the game model is specified. The equivalence with the duo-
poly model is easily verified. 
A stationary strategy 1r for player 1 1.n the game model is a vector 
(1r 1 ,1r 2 , ... ,1rN), where 1fk is a probabiiity distribution on the set of pure 
actions for player 1 in state k. For a strategy 1r for player l we denote 
the probability with which he chooses pure action (t 1 (k),a 1 (k)) in state k 
by 1r(t 1(k),a 1 (k)). 
Analogue notations hold for a stationary strategy p for player 2. 
If the players play the stationary strategies 1r and p respectively, 
then the total expected discounted payoff to player i can be found as the 
unique solution of the following set of equations: 
(2.3) 1V • (k , n , p ) = 
l. 
l l 1r k ( t 1 (k) , a 1 (k) ) • 
(t 1 (k),a 1 (k)) (t 2 (k),a2 (k)) 
• pk ( t 2 (k) , a 2 (k)) { gi (k, ( t I (k) , a I (k)) , ( t 2 (k) , a 2 (k))) + 
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N 
+ 8 (k, ( t l (k) , a 1 (k)) , ( tz (k) , a2 (k))) • Q,L p (Q. I k, al (k) , a2 (k)) • 
k = 1,2, ••• ,N. 
Here v.(k,n,p) denotes the total expected discounted payoff to player i, 
1. 
when the game starts in state k, the players use stationary strategies TI 
and~ respectively and the game moves on over an infinite horizon, 
k = 1,2, ••• ,N. 
DEFINITION 2.1. A pair of strategies (n*,p*) is called an equilibrium point 
if and only if 
k = 1,2, .•• ,N, Vp, 
and 
k = 1 , 2, ••• , N, Yn. 
Now we can state our main theorem. 
THEOREM 2.2. The duopoly modBZ as specified in section 1 possesses an equi-
librium point of stationapY strategies. 
PROOF. From the above shown similari;y between the duopoly model and the 
game model we see, that it suffices if we proof the theorem for the game 
model. But that is a well-known result in stochastic game theory. ROGERS 
[12] was the first who showed this. He restricts himself to the class of 
stationary strategies. That in these models an equilibrium point within the 
class of stationary strategies is also equilibrium point within the class 
of behaviour strategies can be found in VRIEZE [26]. D 
Ifweallowforacertainstatek thepossibilityp.-v. =O, i= 1,2, so the 
· 1 1 
sequence of points at which the players may take an action is not bounded, 
then in the game model player i has in state k a countable number of pure 
actions. Also in that case the game model and so the duopoly model possess-
es an equilibrium point of stationary strategies, but now we must base 
ourself on a heavier theorem as e.g. can be found in VRIEZE [26] or 
FEDE RGRUN [ 3] . 
It is known that in general this game model possesses more than one 
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equilibrium point, so a natural question thrusts upon itself, namely, are 
there conditions under which the above model has a unique equilibrium point 
and furthermore how close stand these conditions to reality. The following 
section let in some light on these questions. 
3. UNIQUE EQUILIBRIUM POINTS 
We first consider the one-period case, then the problem reduces to 
a bimatrix game. 
Let player I have m pure actions and player 2 n. 
Let A be the mxn-matrix of payoffs for player I and B be the mxn-
matrix of payoffs for player 2. 
We now state some properties for payoff matrices, which will be very 
useful in formulating conditions under which a bimatrix game has a unique 
equilibrium point. 
P 1: a payoff matrix for player I (player 2) is said to be 
one-peaked in the columns (rows) if for each column j 
(row i) the following hol'ds: 
there exist a unique ,i0 (j 0), 
Vi :f, io (b .. > b .. , Vj :f, jo)· 
l.Jo l.J 
such that a• • ioJ > a •• ' l.J 
In the following for a one-peaked payoff matrix for player I (player 2) 
we denote with i. (j 1.) the row (column) such that a .. >a .. , Vi :f, i., J l.jJ l.J J 
j = I, ... ,n (b .. > b .. , Vj :f, j., i = I, ... ,m) 
l.Ji l.J l. 
P2 : a one-peaked payoff matrix for player I (player 2) is said 
to be slow peak decreasing (slow peak increasing) if the 
following holds: or i. = i. 1 or i. = i. 1-I, j = 2, .•• ,n J J- J J-
(or j. = j. 1 or j.= j. 1+1, i = 2, ••• ,m). l. 1.- l. 1.-
P3: a payoff matrix for player I (player 2) 1.s said to be con-
cave in the columns iff: 
a .. -a. 1. > a. 1.-a .. , i = 2, ... ,m-1; j = I, ... ,n l.J l. - J l. + J l.J 
(b .. -b . . I > b . . 1-b .. , j = 2, ... , n-1 ; i = I , ... , m) . l.J l.J- l.J+ l.J 
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THEOREM 3. I • A bimatrix game such that the payoff matrices A and B obey the 
* * properties P 1, P2 and P3 possesses a unique equilibrium point (x ,Y ), where 
* * both x and y are concentrated at at most two pure actions. 
PROOF. As A and B obey the properties P 1 and P2 exactly one of the following 
two possibilities must occur. 
a) There exist a row i O and a column j O such that 
and 
b) There exist a row i O and a column Jo, such that 
> a. . ' 
I.Jo 
In case a) we clearly have an equilibrium point 1.n pure strategies. 
If b) holds, consider the following 2x2-bimatrix game (A0 ,B0 ): 
(""' "iojo•' ) C .. b.. ) Ao l.oJo Bo= l.OJO 1.0Jo+1 = aiO+l jO a. jO+l b. . b. jo+1 iO+l 1.0+ 1 Jo iO+l 
It is easy to check that this bimatrix game does not possess an equilibrium 
point in pure strategies. Furthermore, as this game is non-degenerate there 
is a unique completely mixed equilibrium point. Let this equilibrium point 
* * . * * * * * * * be (xO,yO), with xO = (xiO,xio+J) and Yo= (Yjo•Yjo+J). Note that xO is the 
unique optimal strategie for player I 1.n the matrix game B0 , where player 
is a minimizing player and that y~ is the unique optimal strategie for 
0 player 2 in the matrix game A, where player 2 is a minimizing player. 
It can now be verified (property P3) that the strategies 
and 
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form an equilibrium point for the game (A,B). 
So both to case a) and to case b) there corresponds an equilibrium point. 
We now claim that in both cases the corresponding equilibrium point is 
the unique equilibrium point for the game (A,B). 
In the following we concentrate upon case b) for in case a) the same reasoning 
can be held with 1 0 substituted for i 0+J and j 0 substituted for j 0+1. 
Assume that (x,y) is an equilibrium point for the game (A,B). 
Let 
and 
We need four steps. 
- * * Step I. Let x = x. From property P3 it can be seen that y is strictly 
better for player 2 against x than every other strategy, so 
* - * - * y = y • In the same way: if y = y, then x = x. 
Step 2. Let x be such that x 1 = 0 and x2 # 0. From property P3 it follows 
that y must be such that y 1 =·o, for if y 1 # 0 then transferring 
this weight to column j 0 would be strictly better for player 2. 
But now it follows that player I yields more if he transfer the 
weight x2 t~ the row i 0+1, so there exists no y such that for 
this X (x,y) is an equilibrium point. 
Step 3. Let x be such that x2 = 0 and x 1 # 0. Then y must be such that 
y2 = 0 (else transferring to j 0+1), from which we see that player 
gets more if he transfers the weight x 1 to the row i 0 , so also 
this (x,y) cannot be an equilibrium point. 
An analogue reasoning as in the steps 2 and 3 shows that y 
can be neither such that y 1 = 0, y 2 # 0, nor such that y 1 # 0, y2 = 0. 
Step 4. Let x be such that x 1 # 0 and x2 # 0. 
Let i 1 be a row with i 1 < i 0 and xi # 0 and let i 2 be a row with 
I 
i 2 > i 0+t and xi2 # 0. In order (x,y) to be an equilibrium point, 




= X Ay and 
Here A. denotes the i-th row of A. 
]_. 
- -T -A. •y S: x Ay, 
]_ . 
Let j 1 be such that ij 1 = i 1 and ij 1_ 1 = i 1+1. Such a j 1 exists for else 
row it l would be strictly better for player. l than row i 1 . 










Note that each term in the summations of (3.2) is positive. 




. . ]_ 1 
J=J 1 
j 1-1 
~ 2 l (a. 1 . -a. . )y. > 
j=I 1 1+ J 1 13 J 
In the same way we can show 
n 
l (a .. -a. l.)y.~ 





(3. 3) k = 2, 3, •.• , m-i I • 
As i 2 E {itk I k=2,3, ... ,m-i} we see that (3.3) contradicts (3.1), so 
again (i,y) cannot be an equilibrium point. 
* * Combining these four steps yields the conclusion that (x ,y) is the only 
equilibrium point for the game (A,B). 0 
1 1 
In regarding the properties P 1, P2 and P3 the properties P 1 and P3 seem 
to be quite natural for a duopoly situation. Property P2 is the strongest 
one. A reasoning which makes this property somewhat acceptable is the 
following: the set of pure actions for a player must be seen as the lattice 
b,lbLIV I rjtct:, '' ,. 
/\M:, Y ,J,U,\M 
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points of the original action space, which is assumed to be an interval. As 
it is reasonable to assume the payoff functions to be continuous on these 
original action spaces it is imaginable that the lattice may be chosen in 
such a wat that two consecutive points for a player give only small devia-
tions in the payoff values for the other player so that his best replies 
against these two points respectively must be close together. 
We now go back to the stochastic game. We are going to state two 
theorems concerning uniqueness of equilibrium points in two-person non-
zero stochastic games. 
A two-person non-zero sum stochastic game will be denoted by a 
fixed-tuple (S,A,B,P,8) where: 
S = {1,2, ••• ,N} is the set of states. 
A= (A1, ••• ,~) with Aic a (~x°k)-matrix, such that aij(k) is the 
payoff to player I in state kif player I chooses row i and 
player 2 chooses column j, i = 1,2, ••• ,~; j = 1,2, ••• ,nk. 
B = (B 1, ••• ,Bn), the same as A but for player 2. 
p = {p(ilk,i,j) I i= I, ... ,~; j = I, ... ,°k; i= l, ... ,N; k= l, ... ,N} 
is the set of transition probabilities, i.e. if in state k the 
joint players action is (i,j) then the probability that the 
system moves to state i is p(ilk,i,j). 
8 = {8 .. (k) I 1= 1, ••• ,m., j = l, ... ,n., k= l, ... ,N} is the set of 
1,J K K 
discount factors, where 8 .. (k) belongs to state k and actions (i,j). 
l.J 
DEFINITION 3.2. For a two-person non-zero sum stochastic game (S,A,B,P,8) 
n - n and for each v I e: lR and v2 e: lR the elements of the following set of N 
bimatrix games are called the dummy bimatrix games with v1 and v2: 
where 
a .. (k) = a .. (k) + 8 .. (k) 
l.J l.J l.J 
and 
y .. (k) = b .. (k) + 8 .. (k) 








We need the following lennna. 
. . . ( * * . h * <-* -*) LEMMA 3.3. A pa&r of stat&onary strateg&es x ,Y) W&t x = x 1 , ••• ,~ 
and y * = (y~ 1, ••• ,y;) is an equilibrium point for a game (S ,A,B,P, B) if and 
only if (i;,;,;) is an equilibrium point in the associated dwnnry bimatrix 
-* -,< -* . d a· d game Gk(v 1,v,)), k = l, ••. ,N, where V. &S the total expecte &Scounte pay-,_ 1 
off to playe1" i, i = 1,2, under the strategi~s (x*,y*) in the stochastic 
game .. 
PROOF. The proof of this lellllila can be found in FEDERGRUN [3] (lemma 2.3) 
and also in VRIEZE [ 26] ( the proof of theorem 2. l), al though they both have 
B . . (k) = B, Vi, Vj, Vk. For the proof this is not an essential assumption. D 
1] 
- - 2N 
Let for a stochastic game (S,A,B,P,8) and for a vector (v 1,v2 ) E 1R 
Tk(; 1,;2) denote the set of equilibrium points for dummy bimatrix game 
Gk(; 1,:;2) and let Uk(; 1,;2 ) denote the set of payoff pairs associated with 
these equilibrium points. 
DEFINITION 3.4. A pair of vectors (:; 1,;2) E JR.
2N and (w 1 ,w2 ) E JR.2N is 
called contracting with respect to a game ·cs,A,B,P ,B) if and only if for 
-o -o N - - -o -o N 
each (v 1,v2 ) E Xk=l Uk(v 1,v2) and each (w 1 ,w2 ) E Xk=l Uk(w 1 ,w2 ) the follow-
ing holds: 
with O ~a< I and ll•II denoting the sup norm in JR.2N 
THEOREM 3.5. If for a stochastic game (S,A,B,P,B) each pair of vectors 
( - - ) 2N • · h Ji h. h . . v 1,v2 E 1R &S contract&ng, ten or t &S stoc ast&c game every equ&-
librium point yields the same payoffs for both players. 
PROOF. Let (x*,y*) and (;,y) be two equilibrium points for the stochastic 
-* -* ~ ~ 
game and let the associated payoff pairs be (v 1,v2), respectively (w 1,w2). 
From leI!llila 3.3 it follows 
-* -* matrix game Gk(v 1,v2) and 
matrix game Gk(~ 1.~2). 
-* -* that (~,yk) is equilibrium point in the dummy bi-
that C\,yk) is equilibrium point in the dummy bi-
-* -* -* -From equation (2.3) we see that (~,yk) in Gk(v 1 ,v2 ) yields a payoff 
pair (;; (k),;~;(k)) and analogue (ik,:~\) in Gk(~ 1.~2 ) yields a payoff pair 
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~ ~ -k -k N -* -k (w1(k),w2(k)). So it is clear that (v1,v2) € Xk=I Uk(v1,v2) and 
~ ~ N ~ ~ 
(w I'w2) € xk=I uk (w I'w2). 
Using the contracting property with (v;,v;) and (i1,i2) we get 
Note that theorem 3.5 states that in the case where each pair of vectors 
<v1,v2> JR2N and <wl'w2> 
2N contracting the map <vl'v2>+ € € JR are 
n - -
Xk=I Uk(vl,v2) has exactly one fixed point. 
Note also that it is enough if the contracting property holds for 
each pair of vectors (vl'v2) and (wl'w2), such that llv1D s; M1/(I-f3), 
llv2II s; Mz'(I-f3), llw 1U s; M1/(I-f3) and llw2II s; M2/(I-f3), where M1 = .ma.x lai.(k)I, 1,J,k J 
M2 =.ma.x lbi.(k)I and f3 =}lla.x f3i.(k). 1,J,k J 1,J,k J 
THEOREM 3.6. Let for a stochastic game (S,A,B,P,f3) the following hold: 
- - 2N - -a) For each (vl'v2) E JR such that llv 1II s; M/(I-f3) and llv2II s; Mz'(I-f3) 
each dummy bimatrix game ~ (v 1 , v 2) , k = I , ••• , N obey the properties P 1 , P 2 
and P3 • 
b) In addition to a): for each k the dummy bimatrix games Gk(v 1,v2) have the 
same structu:r>e for each (v 1, Vz) such that II v 1" s; Ml/ ( 1-13) and ff v} s; 
M2/(l-f3), i.e. or Gk(v1,v2) has a unique pure equilibrium point which is 
the same for each (v 1,v2), or Gk(v1,v2) has a unique equilibrium point 
where player 1 uses two consecutive rows and player 2 uses two consecutive 
columns, such that these two rows and two columns are the same for each 
(v 1,v2) (the weights on them need not be the same). 
If a) and b) hold, then the stochastic game has a unique equilibrium point. 
PROOF. We will show that 
lRZN such that llv111 ,llw1H 
- - 2N each pair of vectors (v1,v2) € JR 
s; M1/(l-f3) and llv2II ,Uw2U s; M2/(J-f3) 
and (w l ,w2) € 
are contracting 
with contraction radius (3. Then theorem 3.5 tells us that the map 
(v1,v2) + x:=I Uk(v1,v2) (Uk(v1,v2) contains but one element, k = l, .•• ,N) 
-* -* has a unique fixed point (v1,v2) and from condition a) in the theorem we 
-* -* see that Gk(v 1,v2) has a unique equilibrium point, k = 1, .•• ,N, which by 
lemma 3.3 constitutes an equilibrium point for the stochastic game which 
therefore must also be unique. 
Fix k E {l, .•• ,N}. We only consider the case where player 1 must use 
in the k-th dummy bimatrix game two rows, say i 1 and i 1+t and player 2 two 
columns, say j 1 and j 1+t. The other case can be treated quite analogue. 
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o- - o- o- . . - -Let Gk(v 1,v2) = (~(v1),Bk(v2)) denote the restriction of Gk(v1,v2) to 
the rows i 1 and i 1+1 and the columns j 1 and J1+1, so (~(v1),B~(v2)) is a 
(2x2)°-bimatrix game. From condition a) and the proof of theorem 3.1 we see 
that this (2x2)-bimatrix game has a unique equilibrium point (x~(v1,v2), 
-* - - -* - -y0 (v1,v2)) such that x0 (v 1,v2) is the unique completely mixed optimal 
strategy for player I in the matrix game B~(v2) (player I the minimizing 
player) and y~(v 1,v2) is the unique completely mixed optimal strategy for 
0 -player 2 in the matrix game ~(v1) (player 2 the minimizing player). But 
this means that the payoffs to the players I and 2, which belong to the 
- - 0 - oT -unique equilibrium point of Gk(v 1,v2), equal val{~(v 1)} and val{Bk (v2)} 
oT - o -
respectively, where Bk (v2) denotes the transpose matrix of Bk(v2) and 
val{matrix} denotes the value of a matrix game in the usual sense. 
-* - - -* - -As in the proof of theorem 3.1 the p~ir (x0 (v1,v2),y0 (v1,v2)) can be 
extended to the unique equilibrium pair of Gk(v1,v2) and the payoffs for the 
players I and 2 belonging to this equilibrium pair of Gk(v2,v2) are the 
0 - 0 -same, so val{~(v1)} and val{Bk(v2)} respectively. 
Now let (v 1,v2) and (w 1,w2) as desired and let the corresponding equilibrium 
points be (~(v1,v2),yk(v1,v2)) and (~(w1,w2),yk(w1,w2)) respectively. Then 
(3.4) 
The last inequality follows from the theory of zero sum stochastic games 




As O :5: S < I the contracting property follows from (3 .4) and (3. 5). D 
We conclude with the remark that the two conditions 1.n theorem 3.6 are 
met if the matrices A_ = {a• . (k)} and Bk = {b .. (k)} obey the properties 
-""k l.J l.J 
P1, P2 and P3 , k = l, ... ,N and furthermore if p(tjk,i,j) for all k and£ 
does not depend on i and j. 
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